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R. v. N.S.: WHAT IS FAIR IN A TRIAL?
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S DIVIDED OPINION
ON THE NIQAB IN THE COURTROOM
FAISAL BHABHA
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, a woman entered an Ontario courtroom to give evidence at a preliminary inquiry
involving childhood sexual assault charges against her uncle and cousin. She sought to testify
while wearing a niqab, a garment that conceals the entire head and face, leaving only an
opening for the eyes.' The Court was asked to decide the novel question of whether it could
accommodate the Muslim veil in a justice system that provides the accused with a right to
face his accuser. The Supreme Court ofCanada divided three ways, with justices disagreeing
deeply both about the analysis for determining whether to permit a witness to wear the niqab
and the values and interests at play in the analysis.
While the majority judgment endorsed a variety of commitments to fundamental
constitutional principles, it left unresolved tension in the articulation of essential components
oftrial fairness. Framed as a collision between equally important Canadian Charter ofRights
andFreedoms2 rights, the majority's effort at reconciliation and balancing paired rhetorical
guarantees of substantive equality and respect for difference and multiculturalism with
vanishing results for members of a marginalized social group - in this case, veiled Muslim
women. The likely adverse impact of the judgment on this. group will only confirm the
aphorism that hard cases make bad law, and highlights the need for constitutional soul-
searching to realign constitutional aspirations of equality with social realities.
II. CASE HISTORY
R. v. N.S. originated as a procedural decision in a criminal preliminary inquiry. The
charges involved two men accused of historical sexual assault against a female relative. The
alleged abuse occurred between 1982 and 1987, beginning when the complainant was six
years old. As a teenager, she revealed the allegations to a high school teacher, but parental
reluctance held police back from laying charges. It was not until 2007 that N.S., now an adult
in her 30s, was able to lay a complaint and to proceed with charges in a prosecution in which
she would be the principal witness.
Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. The author acted as counsel to one
of the intervenors in R v NS, 2012 SCC 72, 290 CCC (3d). The opinions expressed herein are entirely
his own. He thanks numerous individuals for constructive conversations, including Benjamin Berger,
Sonia Lawrence, Bruce Ryder, Mihad Fahmy, Julia Williams, Fahad Siddiqui, Sharifa Khan, Nader
Hasan, Ranjan Agarwal, Mayya Mukhamedyarova, Fathima Cader, and Diana Younes.
R v NS, 2012 SCC 72, 290 CCC (3d) at paras 1, 4 [NS]. The niqab is contested amongst Muslims. For
some, it is believed to be a firm religious requirement; for others, it is a careful way to conform to a strict
Islamic rule of modesty in dress. For still many more, it is variously viewed as an uniecessary burden,
an anti-social affront, misguided asceticism, or a proclamation of fanaticism.
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11
[Charter].
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As is common in sexual assault trials, the complainant's credibility as victim would be
critical to securing a conviction. But how would a trier of fact determine the credibility of
the alleged victim as a witness if her face were not fully exposed? How would defence
counsel be able to adequately test and press her evidence through cross-examination if she
were to have the advantage of concealing her expressions from the Court's gaze? These
questions were raised as a challenge to N.S.'s assertion that her constitutional right to
religious freedom assures accommodation of the niqab.
The accuseds objected to N.S.'s attire, asking the preliminary inquiry judge for an order
to require her to remove her niqab to testify. They claimed that their statutory right to cross-
examine the witness was unfairly restricted and that any obstruction to counsel's ability to
effectively challenge the witness would improperly derogate from the constitutional right to
make full answer and defence. Further, they argued the possibility of imprisonment raised
a constitutional liberty interest, which should only be suspended in accordance with
principles of fundamental justice. The defence submitted that a witness's religious
preferences, however sincere, could not meet the test of fundamental justice if it leads to a
deprivation of liberty. Nothing short of "face-to-face" confrontation would satisfy the state's
constitutional obligations to the accused.
Addressing the preliminary inquiry judge without counsel, N.S. explained that she was a
devout Muslim who adopted the niqab as a form of religious practice, complying with a
faith-based conviction. 3 She stated that the niqab was a core tenet of her belief system and
personal identity.' She declared that she would be uncomfortable with removing the veil in
an open courtroom that was, by her description, "full of men."' She further highlighted the
fact that the accuseds were both members of her community and of her family; they even
attended the same mosque as her husband.6 Removing the veil in such circumstances, she
stated, would put her in a position of dishonour within the value system of her religious-
cultural community, of which the accuseds were also members. She disagreed with defence
counsel that exposing her face would add any evidentiary value - "it's not going to help,
it really won't," she declared.' She reassured the Court that defence counsel would have
ample opportunity to read her body language and have direct eye contact during cross-
examination.
The preliminary inquiry judge administered a form of the Amselem test, the Supreme
Court's lead precedent regarding religious accommodation, which requires the claimant to
establish a sincerely-held religious belief.' The judge found that N.S. had not established a
sufficiently "strong" belief because she admitted to having previously removed her niqab to
R v NS, 2010 ONCA 670 at paras 3-6, 262 CCC (3d) [NS, ONCA]. It is worth noting that at the
preliminary inquiry, NS's comments with respect to the sincerity of her religious belief and the impact
of removing the niqab were given unsworn, as the judge refused to administer the oath to the witness
while wearing her niqab.
4 See Natasha Bakht, "Objection, Your Honour! AccommodatingNiqab-Wearing Women in Courtrooms"
in Ralph Grillo et al, eds, Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2009) 115
at 116 citing a variety of factors that may motivate women to adopt different forms of Islamic veil,
including hijab or niqab.
Transcript of preliminary inquiry, quoted in NS, ONCA, supra note 3 at para 5.
6 Ibid.
Ibid.
Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 SCR 551 [Amselem].
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be photographed for a driver's licence by a female official.' She had also stated that she
would, on request, remove her niqab for identification purposes at international border
crossings.
On appeal at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Justice Frank Marrocco rejected the
preliminary inquiryjudge's approach and reaffirmed theAmselem "subjective sincerity test,"
which requires evidence about the sincerity of the conviction, not the consistency of the
claimant's conduct.'o The Court held that "where an application is made to require a witness
to remove her niqab, the court must enquire into the reason for the wearing of the niqab and
the genuineness of any religious belief relied on to explain the wearing of the niqab.""
Quashing the preliminary inquiry judge's order requiring that N.S. testify without a niqab,
the matter was remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge for redetermination.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the Court considered the various aspects of
the case and sought to set out a framework for balancing the competing rights of a witness
to religious freedom with those of the accused to a fair trial. Justice Doherty, writing for the
panel, framed the issue at the very outset of his judgment as "an apparent conflict between
the constitutional rights of a witness in a criminal proceeding and the constitutional rights
of the accused in that same proceeding." 2 This framing recognized the presumptive interest
for a woman who wears the niqab to be accommodated while testifying. However, it also
took as a given that a witness testifying in a niqab would raise concerns about the fairness
of the trial.
Although the decision of the Court of Appeal affirmed that the niqab engaged
constitutional rights and triggered the duty to accommodate, N.S. appealed. The Court's
balancing test, framed to resolve the "conflict" between two opposed sets of interests and
rights (trial fairness versus religious freedom), had dominated the appellate Court's decision
and left N.S. subject to the substantial discretion of the criminal court judge. She would be
expected to explain and defend her religious attire in a pre-trial hearing before being
permitted to testify. Instead, she sought an outright recognition of a right to testify in a niqab.
The case captured the public's attention as it worked its way through the legal system. The
issue dovetailed with polarized public discourse around multiculturalism, immigration, and
the scope of public tolerance.' Five intervenors had appeared before the Court of Appeal,
representing groups concerned with the rights of the criminally accused, 4 the interests of
9 NS, ONCA, supra note 3 at paras 6-7.
1o R vNS (2009), 95 OR (3d) 735 at paras 92-97 [NS, ONSC]. See also NS, supra note I at paras I 1-13 (per
McLachlin, CJ): "The preliminary inquiry judge failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into whether
N.S.'s refusal to remove her niqab was based on a sincere religious belief."
NS, ONCA, supra note 3 at para 13, referring to N.S., ONSC, ibid at paras 88-101.
12 NS, ONCA, ibid at para 1.
1 See e.g. Sheema Khan, "Hate it if you want, but don't ban the niqab," The Globe andMail (14 December
2011), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/hate-it-if-you-want-
but-dont-ban-the-niqab/article4180899> warning ofthe danger of banning unpopular minority opinions
and practices, especially where it exacerbates social exclusion. For a contrary, contemporaneous view,
see Barbara Kay, "Feminists back women as possessions in Supreme Court case," The National Post (9
December 2011), online: The National Post <http://www.fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/12/09/
barbara-kay-feminists-back-women-as-possessions-in-supreme-court-case/> warning of the danger of
mixing religion and state, and of allowing "multicultural correctness" to turn a blind eye to symbols of
inequality.
14 Criminal Lawyers' Association.
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sexual assault victims," individual expressive freedoms, 6 and competing approaches to
equality," amongst others. Nine were granted leave to make written submissions to the
Supreme Court,'" and three were also permitted time for oral argument.
III. JUDGMENT AT THE SUPREME COURT
The majority judgment, penned by Chief Justice McLachlin and endorsed by three others
of the seven-member panel (Justices Deschamps, Fish, and Cromwell), seized the middle
ground between the diametrically opposed minority judgment of Justice LeBel (joined by
Justice Rothstein) and Justice Abella's solo dissent.19 The majority judgment built on Justice
Doherty's proportionality approach, articulating a framework for trial judges to use when
deciding whether to allow a witness to testify in a niqab. The framework is comprised of four
sequential questions:
1. Would requiring the witness to remove the niqab while testifying interfere with her religious
freedom?
2. Would permitting the witness to wear the niqab while testifying create a serious risk to trial fairness?
3. Is there a way to accommodate both rights and avoid the conflict between them?
4. If no accommodation is possible, do the salutary effects of requiring the witness to remove the niqab
outweigh the deleterious effects of doing so?20
Under the first question, the inquiry incorporated the Amselem test. The claimant bears the
onus of establishing a sincere belief in a requirement to wear the niqab. Sincerity is not
compromised by lapsed practices or inconsistent observance. The Court resisted any
invitation to engage in evaluating or assessing a claimant's correctness of religious
observance, or the substantive coherence ofreligious lifestyle choices. Implicitly recognizing
that many religious people face tough choices all the time in secular society and routinely
strike compromises between their personal convictions and social realities, the Court refused
to allow past practice to define a claimant's sincerity ofbelief.21 On the facts of the N.S. case,
the Court could have ended the analysis at this point and remitted the matter to the
preliminary inquiry judge to re-determine the issue. But in the interest of articulating a
'" Women's Legal and Education Action Fund (LEAF).
16 The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA).
17 Ontario Human Rights Commission and the Muslim Canadian Congress. These two intervenors took
opposing views: the former highlighted the importance of accommodation and respect for religious
choices to promoting an inclusive society; the latter highlighted the oppressive nature of the niqab and
encouraged a ban to liberate Muslim women from patriarchal cultural practices.
I In addition to the five intervenors at the Court ofAppeal, Supreme Court intervenors included the Barbra
Schlifer Commemorative Clinic, South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario (SALCO), Canadian Council on
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) and the Barreau du Qu6bec.
9 NS, supra note I at para 2 (per McLachlin CJ): "A secular response that requires witnesses to park their
religion at the courtroom door is inconsistent with the jurisprudence and Canadian tradition, and limits
freedom ofreligion where no limit can be justified. On the other hand, a response that says a witness can
always testify with her face covered may render a trial unfair and lead to wrongful conviction."
20 NS, ibid at para 9.
21 Ibid at para 13.
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judicial approach to the broader issue of conflicting rights, the Court proceeded to explain
the subsequent questions to explore.
The second issue was whether the niqab posed a threat to trial fairness. The majority
highlighted two main components of the multilayered constitutional right to a fair trial. First
was the need for meaningful cross-examination, coupled with the importance of effective
credibility assessment. Chief Justice McLachlin was persuaded that the niqab posed a
presumptive obstruction to trial fairness because it prevents the accused, counsel, and the
court from viewing the witness's face during cross-examination.22 Rolled into this
presumption of obstruction was the idea that any limit on accessing demeanour evidence
compromises both the effectiveness of the cross-examination and the ability of the trier of
fact to assess credibility.23
Having set up the conflict of rights with the first two questions, the next question was to
ask whether the conflict could be resolved through accommodation or compromise. In order
to make this determination, the Court held that the parties should adduce evidence outlining
possible options that might yield a solution that respects both the witness's religious freedom
and the accused's right to a fair trial.24 Only if this aversion of conflict, or
"accommodation,"25 is impossible should the judge then move to the final question, which
involves a careful balancing of interests.
Upon reaching the balancing stage, trial judges were directed to determine whether the
salutary effects of requiring the witness to remove the niqab outweigh the deleterious effects
of allowing her to wear it. This test is lifted from the Supreme Court's section I
jurisprudence dealing with justifying government incursions on Charterrights.26 Justification
of a rights breach requires reasoning, and for at least the past 20 years, Canadian courts have
employed the proportionality inquiry.27 Proportionality, orjustificatory analysis, was likely
considered appropriate here because, regardless of how the niqab question will be resolved
in any particular case, the impact would necessarily be interpreted as a limitation of one party
or the other's Charter right.
Looking at the deleterious effects of limiting a Charter right, the Court described two
levels of potential harm. The first involved the direct and personal impact on the affected
individual, which necessitates considering both subjective and objective factors, such as the
"value of adherence to a religious conviction," the importance of the "practice to the
claimant," and the "degree of state interference with the religious practice."2 8 The second
level of inquiry involved considering the "broader societal harms of requiring a witness to
remove the niqab in order to testify."29 This latter inquiry focused not on the individual
impact that accompanies a court order to unveil, but the wider consequences of discouraging
22 Ibid at paras 20-2 1, acknowledging that the evidentiary "record sheds little light on the question of
whether seeing a witness's face is important to effective cross-examination and credibility assessment
and hence to trial fairness."
23 Ibid at paras 25-27.
24 Ibid at paras 30-33.
25 Ibid at para 32.
26 See R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 [Oakes].
27 Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [ 1994] 3 SCR 835 at 878 [Dagenais].
28 NS, supra note I at para 36.
29 Ibid at para 37.
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potential complainants and witnesses from reporting offences, pursuing prosecution, or
participating in the justice system." This factor would be especially concerned with
consequences for sex crime prosecutions, described by the Court as being "vigorously
pursued" by the justice system in recent decades."
Turning to salutary effects, the majority characterized the primary benefits of forcing a
witness to remove her niqab as "preventing harm to the fair trial interest of the accused and
safeguarding the repute of the administration of justice."32 Because the niqab imposes a
"severe" cost on the individual's right to "effective cross-examination and credibility
assessment,"" its restriction would, under this analysis, often be necessary to protect trial
fairness. Indeed, for the majority, the more important the witness's evidence to the trial, the
less likely that she would be permitted to testify in a niqab. The majority did not, however,
go so far as to create an absolute ban on niqabs. The judgment noted that it is onlyjustifiable
to compel the removal of the niqab where the risk to trial fairness is, as the Court stated in
Dagenais, "real and substantial."34 An absolute ban would capture witnesses whose
testimony would not pose such danger to trial fairness. Chief Justice McLachlin pointed out
that "uncontested and uncontroversial evidence does not engage the fair trial interest.""
Indeed, this would likely be the only type of evidence from behind a niqab that would not
imperil a fair trial.
The result of the majority's reasoning is that where the proceeding involves high stakes
(such as the potential of imprisonment for the accused) and where the witness's evidence is
critical and contested (as in most sexual assault prosecutions), a woman in a niqab will
almost certainly be required to expose her face for cross-examination." The majority further
rejected certain exceptions that the Court ofAppeal had endorsed. For instance, Chief Justice
McLachlin was sceptical of the suggestion that the harm to trial fairness would be diminished
in a trial before a judge alone (as compared to a judge and jury). She was doubtful that a
judge would be able to predict whether the niqab would interfere with credibility assessments
at trial based solely on inquiries into the witness's religious freedom claim in the setting of
a preliminary inquiry." Similarly, she was not convinced that, in a jury trial, a judge's
curative instruction could mitigate any harm caused by a witness's niqab." The result of the
majority judgment is a proportionality test that creates a de facto rule that women
complainants in sexual assault cases must unveil to testify for the prosecution.
30 Ibid at para 37.
3 Ibid. This argument was emphasized in the intervenor submissions ofthe Barbra Shlifer Commemorative
Clinic and the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario (SALCO).
32 NS, ibid at para 38.
33 Ibidatpara38.
34 Ibid at para 28, citing Dagenais, supra note 27 at 878, in which the Court stated that any risk to trial
fairness must be "real and substantial."
35 NS, supra note I at para 56.
36 On 24 April 2013, Justice Weisman of the Ontario Court of Justice applied the majority judgment to
decide whether to permit N.S. to testify in niqab and concluded: "Having followed the directions of the
Supreme Court on this voir dire, I find that I am obliged to require N.S. to remove her niqab while
testifying at the preliminary inquiry" (The Queen v M-dSand M-1S (24 April 2013) (Ont Ct J)).
3 NS, supra note I at para 41.
3 Ibid, at para 42.
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IV. MINORITY AND DISSENT
The minority judgment of Justices LeBel and Rothstein reached the same outcome as the
majority, but adopted a very different analysis. In particular, the minority justices rejected
the majority's acceptance of the principle that a witness should be permitted to testify in a
niqab, subject to a case-by-case proportionality exercise. For Justice LeBel, only a "clear
rule"39 could provide the necessary constitutional assurances of trial fairness.4 From this
perspective, the balancing of interests was settled: legal tradition regarding participation in
the trial process was sufficiently tied to foundational common law and constitutional values
that the niqab should never be accommodated.4 1 Conditioning the respect for differences on
the "preserv[ation] of common values of Canadian society," Justice LeBel identified a "core
common value" of open-faced communication.42 By this logic: "A clear rule that niqabs may
not be worn would be consistent with the principle of openness of the trial process and would
safeguard the integrity of that process as one of communication.' 3
Justice Abella took the opposite position, refusing to concede that the niqab is,
presumptively, an obstruction to a fair trial and rejecting the idea of a ban, whether explicit
or de facto. She relied on a variety of sources, highlighted by many of the intervenors and
mostly ignored by the majority, which cast doubt on the value of demeanour evidence." She
further noted that if a "rule" of open-faced examination exists, it is subject to routine
exceptions. She cited examples of courts that "regularly accept the testimony of witnesses
whose demeanour can only be partially observed."45 These included witnesses who cannot
hear,46 who require the use of a language interpreter,47 who have physical or mental
disabilities which impact their cognitive or expressive functions,48 who are children,49 or who
are not able to be present and instead give evidence by telephone."o Invoking the Court's
reasoning in R. v. Mills that trial fairness must account for more than just the accused's best
interests, but also the "view of fairness in the eyes of the community and the complainant,"'"
Justice Abella encouraged a deeper enquiry into what fairness owes those with personal
characteristics that require special consideration. She concluded that "trial fairness cannot
reasonably expect ideal testimony from an ideal witness in every case."52
3 Ibid at para 78
40 Ibid at para 69 (per LeBel J): "[T]he niqab should be allowed either in all cases or not at all ... a clear
rule should be chosen."
41 Ibid at para 67 (per LeBel J): "[T]he Canadian criminal trial process remains faithful in its core aspects
to an adversarial model. This process developed in the common law. Some of its features are now part
of the constitutional order.... This model ofjustice imposes a significant personal burden on witnesses
and parties. This burden cannot be lifted entirely."
42 Ibid at paras 70-71.
43 Ibid at para 78.
4 Ibid at paras 98-108.
45 Ibidat para 102. The minorityjustices accepted that exceptions are warranted in some cases, but rejected
an exceptionalism approach in this case (at para 75).
46 Ibidatpara 102.
47 Ibid at para 92.
48 Ibid at para 103. Justice LeBel drew a distinction between people with physical disabilities that impair
communication and a woman in niqab. For the disabled, the accommodation will be an assistive
mechanism that promotes their communication, while the niqab "does not facilitate acts of
communication" (at para 77). The logic of this argument, of course, fails to explain how a ban on the
niqab promotes communication when it will have the effect of silencing many women who would
otherwise testify.
49 Ibid at para 92, citing the use of screens for children.
so Ibid at para 104.
5' Ibid at para 95, citing Rv Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668 at para 72.
52 NS, ibidat para 107.
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V. THE JUDGMENT: OPINION AND IMPACT
No doubt, opinions about the Court's ruling in N.S. are as diverse as the competing
viewpoints at play in the judgments. It is rare for the Court to be so divided." From the
perspective of conventional rights analysis, the majority's approach reflected the dominant
jurisprudential trend.54 Indeed, virtually all of the judicial analysis at all levels of court
assumed that the case should be analyzed as a "conflict" of rights requiring "balancing." The
conflict was framed as freedom of religion versus trial fairness. The freedom of religion
claim was grounded in multiculturalist values, while the trial fairness argument was rooted
in the values of the adversarial system. Two important "justice" causes - the protection of
minorities and the protection of the criminally accused - were at odds in this logic. Because
both sides' claims were just, but pitted the interests of two vulnerable individuals in conflict,
the case presented a classic dilemma.
N.S.'s claim did not dispute the importance of the accused's right to a fair trial, but rather
questioned the particular threat that the niqab could actually pose to the accused's
constitutional trial rights, including the presumption of innocence and right not to be unjustly
deprived of liberty. This challenge required the Court to consider the logic and evidentiary
basis for constitutionalizing specific forms of courtroom practice, such as open-faced cross-
examination. The Court did not find any evidence to support the assumption that the ability
to see a witness's entire face is necessary for effective cross-examination or credibility
assessment,5 5 nor did it hear any evidence to support the contrary assertion.s6 All the Court
had to rely on was the "common law assumption" that witnesses in criminal courts are
expected to testify "with their faces visible to counsel, the judge and the jury."" For the
majority, this "ancient and persistent connection"" between open-faced testimony and a fair
trial would prevail, absent evidence to refute the "long-standing assumptions of the common
law regarding the importance of a witness's facial expressions to cross-examination and
credibility assessment.""
The second formulation of trial fairness in the majority's judgment emphasized systemic
and institutional integrity. This view concentrated on public interest considerations and
5 Kirk Makin, "Changes coming fast for Supreme Court" The Globe and Mail (29 March 2013), online:
The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-law-
page/changes-coming-fast-for-supreme-court/articlel0585748/>: "Of the 66 substantial decisions it
rendered last year [2012], the court spoke unanimously in 65 per cent of the cases."
54 See Oakes, supra note 26.
5s NS, supra note I at para 17 (per McLachlin CJ): "We have no expert evidence in this case on the
importance of seeing a witness's face to effective cross-examination and accurate assessment of a
witness's credibility. All we have are arguments and several legal and social science articles submitted
by the parties as authorities."
56 Ibid at paras 20-21.
5 Ibid at paras 21-22. The experience of the United States is instructive, as this issue has arisen under the
Sixth Amendment of its Constitution, which expressly links the right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him" to the right to a fair trial (US Const amend VI). Justice Antonin Scalia of the
Supreme Court ofthe United States, a fervent originalist interpreter of the US constitution, has described
the defendant's right to a "face-to-face" confrontation with witnesses as a constitutional custom "that
traces back to the beginnings of Western legal culture" (Coy v Iowa, 487 US 1012 at 1015-19 (1988)),
writing for a 6-3 majority. In a subsequent decision, the Court reversed, splitting 5-4, with Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor writing that face-to-face confrontation is an important but not "indispensable element"
of the confrontation right (Maryland v Craig, 497 US 836 at 837 (1990)).
5 NS, ibidat para 31.
59 Ibid at para 22.
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prioritized the maintenance of confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole.60 Yet,
the majority's consideration of the public interest was remarkably narrow, focussing almost
entirely on the public perception of the treatment of the accused in the trial process. Fairness
was defined as an abstract and idealized standard ofaccuseds' rights, with little consideration
of the perspectives of other participants in the trial such as victims of sexual assault or
vulnerable members ofthe public. The judgment similarly neglected to analyze what fairness
might mean in different cultural contexts or how blind spots about the impact of "neutral"
rules could contribute to systemic social exclusion.
For those concerned with the sex equality and social diversity implications ofthe decision,
the effect of the majority's balancing test (and of the minority's ban) will be seen to shift the
state's constitutional burden of providing a fair trial onto the niqab-wearing witness. The
witness must now choose whether to break a religious conviction in order to deliver a fair
trial to the accused, knowing that the more central her evidence is to the likelihood of
conviction, the less likely she is to be permitted to testify in niqab. If she chooses not to
testify, the state will be faced with a choice: either it abandons the prosecution due to lack
of evidence, or it asks the court to compel the witness to give her evidence unveiled. This last
option lies at the bottom of the slippery slope of state intrusion into personal expression.
Forced removal of witnesses' niqabs would have both liberty and dignity limiting effects,
with heightened adverse impact because it would primarily affect vulnerable minorities.
Perhaps the most cross-purpose outcome is the scenario of an accused woman unable to
testify in her own defence, or in someone else's, on account of the niqab."
Although the majority were prepared to tolerate some uncomfortable outcomes in the
interest of preserving tried and tested practices, they rejected the minority's call for an
outright ban on niqabs. Yet, despite citing values ofdiversity, inclusion, and access tojustice,
the majority's analytical framework leads to the inevitable result that women like N.S. will
find themselves outside of Charter protection. This outcome roused Justice Abella, who
noted the logical disjuncture between the stated Charter values and the necessary
implications of the majority judgment:
The majority's conclusion that being unable to see the witness' face is acceptable from a fair trial perspective
if the evidence is "uncontested", essentially means that sexual assault complainants, whose evidence will
inevitably be contested, will be forced to choose between laying a complaint and wearing a niqab, which,
as previously noted, may be no meaningful choice at all. 62
If the judgment represented a clear victory for trial fairness it might perhaps have been
celebrated. However, it remains unclear from the majority judgment what trial fairness means
beyond its discomfort with the niqab. While courts have generally taken witnesses as they
are, this case makes state interference in intimate personal characteristics a matter of trial
judge discretion. The majority agreed unquestioningly that "more is better" when it comes
0 Ibid at para 38, emphasizing the importance of preserving "public confidence in the justice system."
61 Ibid at para 109. Justice Abella highlighted this point.
62 Ibid at para 96. See supra note 31 citing Justice Weisman's April 2013 order that NS remove her niqab
to testify.
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to exposing the face." But is the "most" physical exposure the "best" condition for cross-
examination? If so, is the "best" form of cross-examination the standard required for
constitutional compliance? If so, why stop at removing niqabs?
The justification for enforcing a strict rule (or narrow test) against the niqab was wrapped
in commitments to constitutional values. Meanwhile, N.S. lacked the evidence to rebut the
presumptions of established courtroom practice. Given the legal system's preference for
precedent, the status quo shifts languidly if at all. It is thus noteworthy that all of the justices
appear to have agreed with the principle that even strict rules regarding trial fairness require
flexibility.' Such flexibility not only helps to mitigate for individual variation and different
needs, but also to correct the trajectory of institutional inertia. The numerous exceptions to
conventional courtroom rules, emphasized by many intervenors and highlighted in Justice
Abella's judgment, suggested that trial fairness has long been an elastic concept, moulding
to real-world circumstances and accommodating novel needs.
Examples of rule flexibility may be presented as derogation, but they can also represent
principled and necessary modifications to the institutional modes of administering justice.
Accommodation doctrine is derived from normative commitments to equality, and is
enshrined in the Charter as part of section 15.65 Even when section 15 is not explicitly
invoked, accommodation analysis always raises themes of substantive equality. For example,
the fact that thejustice system enables individuals to give testimony through assistive devices
or with the help of a sign or language interpreter is integral to achieving the goals of the
justice system." These measures become necessary norms to facilitate the goals of open
justice, but also to remove barriers to equal participation.67 Accommodation can promote the
public interests of communication, inclusion, and participation in the administration of
justice, while also enhancing the dignity interest of the affected individuals." Justice Abella
noted the link between the denial of accommodation and its discriminatory impact:
As a result, as the majority notes, complainants who sincerely believe that their religion requires them to wear
the niqab in public, may choose not to bring charges for crimes they allege have been committed against
them, or, more generally, may resist being a witness in someone else's trial. It is worth pointing out as well
that where the witness is the accused, she will be unable to give evidence in her own defence. To those
affected, this is like hanging a sign over the courtroom door saying "Religious minorities not welcome.' "
63 Even Justice Abella in her dissent, stated: "I concede without reservation that seeing more of a witness'
facial expressions is better than seeing less. What I am not willing to concede, however, is that seeing
less is so impairing of a judge's or an accused's ability to assess the credibility of a witness, that the
complainant will have to choose between her religious rights and her ability to bear witness against an
alleged aggressor" (NS, ibid at para 82).
6 Even the minority justices, who supported a clear ban on the niqab, recognized the need for
accommodation in some instance to facilitate "access tojustice" for people with disabilities. See NS, ibid
at para 77.
65 Supra note 2, s 15.
6 NS, supra note I at para 92.
67 See e.g. Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [ 1997] 3 SCR 624 (concerning the adverse
effects discrimination caused by a hospital's failure to provide sign language interpretation).
68 The minority judgment focused on the goal of "communication," viewing the niqab as an obstacle. See
NS, supra note I at para 78. The minority justices might have considered the obstacle to be the rule
against the niqab. From this perspective, if communication is the goal, then it logically follows that
measures that enable witnesses to approach and address the court are preferable to those which do not.69 Ibid at para 94 [emphasis added].
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VI. CONCLUSION
In many respects, the N.S. case put the criminal trial system itself on trial. Could
conventional standards of justice be met while modifying traditional courtroom practices?
This was certainly not the first time the Court was called upon to examine traditional norms
in the face of evolving social pressures. In Chief Justice McLachlin's opus on
accommodation, British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission v.
BCGSEU), the Court rejected a workplace physical standard that adversely affected the
female claimant because it bore only tenuous connection to the desired outcome of workplace
efficiency and safety.70 The Court required more than impressions from past practice to
justify a standard that excluded the claimant from employment. Evidence of actual risk or
harm to a legitimate specific objective had to be shown. In N.S., the Court acknowledged that
there was no evidence of any harm to trial fairness caused by a partially covered face.
Demeanour was not proven to be essential to cross-examination or credibility assessment,
despite being a longstanding customary practice. Notwithstanding this dearth of evidence,
the Court was not persuaded to follow its doctrine of bending neutral rules when they have
exclusionary effects.
It is tempting to view N.S. as a singular case. As much as it attracts an accommodation
analysis, the implications of constitutionalizing the niqab generated concern for some about
undermining fundamental civic values. Indeed, just days after the Supreme Court heard oral
argument in the case, the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism issued
an operational bulletin outlining a new requirement that individuals taking the citizenship
oath must expose their faces." In public remarks, Minister Jason Kenney addressed women
in niqab directly: "All we ask of you is to fulfil the requirements of citizenship and that you
swear an oath before your fellow citizens that you will be loyal to our traditions that go back
centuries."72 The Minister emphasized that an open-faced oath was more than a technical
requirement and that it goes to the heart of our collective identity: "It is a public declaration
that you are joining the Canadian family, and it must be taken freely and openly-not with
faces hidden."73 A similar conception of citizenship motivated the introduction of Bill 94 in
the Quebec National Assembly.74 This law requires women in niqab to unveil in order to
receive a wide range of government services. Not surprisingly, both the Quebec legislation
70 [1999] 3 SCR 3. Referring to standards and accommodation, Chief Justice McLachlin wrote for a
unanimous Court: "Employers designing workplace standards owe an obligation to be aware of both the
differences between individuals, and differences that characterize groups of individuals. They must build
conceptions of equality into workplace standards" (ibid at para 68).
71 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Operational Bulletin 359, "Requirements for candidates to be seen
taking the Oath of Citizenship at a ceremony and prodedures for candidates with full or partial face
coverings" (12 December 2011), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.cal
english/resources/manuals/bulletins/201 1/ob359.asp>. The bulletin provides: "At time of check-in, all
candidates wearing full or partial face coverings must be reminded that they will be required to remove
their face coverings for the oath taking portion of the ceremony.... They are to be informed that failure
to do so will result in the candidate not becoming a Canadian citizen on that day and not receiving their
citizenship certificate."
72 Speaking notes for The Honourable Jason Kenney, PC, MP, Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and
Multiculturalism, "On the value of Canadian citizenship" (Montreal, Quebec: 12 December 2011),
online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.calenglish/department/medialspeeches/
2011/2011-12-12.asp>.
7 Ibid.
74 Bill 94, An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation requests within theAdministration and
certain institutions, 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2011.
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and Minister Kenney's bulletin garnered significant public attention and fuelled a spirited
debate.
The immediate impact of the N.S. decision is narrow: few women in Canada currently
wear the niqab and a small minority of them can be expected to encounter the criminaljustice
system. But how related and emerging questions might be answered will depend on a host
of political and other factors, including the substantial renewal of the bench already
underway at the Supreme Court." The minority judgment, endorsed by two justices in the
twilight of their tenure, provided a constitutional justification for an absolute ban on niqabs
in the courtroom. Their reasoning would lend support to those making legal arguments to
extend a niqab ban to citizenship ceremonies and other public services. But the minority's
justification of a ban was rejected by both the majority and dissent. The Court resoundingly
endorsed a fundamental principle of inclusion and accommodation of women in niqab. This
principle is not absolute, though, and is subject to reasonable limits based on legitimate
objectives and actual harm, analyzed through the proportionality test. That the principle of
accommodation was articulated in a case involving a competing interest of the highest order
- an accused's liberty - suggests that the accommodation right that adheres to the niqab
is indeed secure. It is difficult to imagine that an outright ban in a public setting could ever
be constitutionally justified based on the majority's reasoning in N.S. Governments wishing
to restrict the wearing of the niqab in accordance with proportionality will need evidence
establishing a real and clear danger to a more important interest. Whether the governments
of Canada or Quebec will revisit their approaches to niqabs in citizenship ceremonies and
public services, respectively, remains to be seen. It may be just a matter of time before the
Supreme Court is once again asked to define the constitutional rights of veiled Muslim
women.
7s Makin, supra note 53, noting that, "By the end of 2014, only one judge - Chief Justice Beverley
McLachlin - will have spent more than a decade on Canada's top bench."
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DANIELS V. CANADA:
THE INEVITABLE COMES TO PASS, AT LAST
IAN PEACH* AND AARON MINTZ
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the late Harry Daniels, former president of the Native Council of
Canada/Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, launched an action to have the courts issue a
declaration that Mdtis persons and those persons identified by the federal government as
"non-status Indians" be considered "Indians" for the purpose of understanding the meaning
of that term in section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.' The Government of Canada
opposed this action quite vigorously, tying it up in procedural challenges for years. Finally,
on 8 January 2013, the Federal Court of Canada decided the substantive question in issue.2
Justice Phelan concluded that M6tis persons and "non-status Indians" are, indeed, "Indians"
within the meaning of that term in section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and granted
the plaintiffs a declaration to that effect.3
While it took the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples and the other plaintiffs over 13 years to
secure this declaration, and the federal government is appealing this decision so the legal
debate on this matter is not yet at an end, the decision of the Federal Court was, to be blunt,
inevitable. The federal government's policy approach towards Aboriginal peoples has long
attempted to draw a bright line between "status Indians" and other Aboriginal peoples, by
claiming that the federal jurisdiction contained in section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867 is limited to "status Indians" or, even more narrowly, "status Indians" residing on
reserves. This interpretation of the federal jurisdiction has been reflected in policy choices,
such as the limitation of which Aboriginal peoples have access to federally-delivered or
federally-funded programs and services, and the federal insistence that provincial or
territorial governments be parties to self-government agreements. The federal government
thus treats the concept of the "status Indian" as something that is inherently distinct from
other Aboriginal peoples and has attempted to claim that this distinction has been a consistent
feature of the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments since
Confederation in 1867.4
When one probes beneath the rhetoric of federal officials, however, one discovers that the
law in Canada has had a highly flexible understanding of who is an "Indian" over the
decades, particularly prior to the 1951 revision of the Indian Act and the creation of the
Indian Register.5 The federal government's interpretation of who is "Indian," and, therefore,
who can be a beneficiary of the federal government's exercise of its jurisdiction, has long
been a consequence of broader federal policies about the treatment of Aboriginal peoples.
Associate, KTA Inc; previously Dean, Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick.
Student-at-Law, Timmins-Temiskaming Community Legal Clinic.
I (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App 11, No 5.
2 Daniels v Canada (Minister ofIndian Affairs and Northern Development), 2013 FC 6,357 DLR (4th)
47 [Daniels].
lbid at paras 600-601.
4 See e.g. ibid at paras 5, 69.
RSC 1985, c 1-5.
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There is no inherent difference between what we know today as "status Indians" and "non-
status Indians," nor has there been a consistent definition of just who falls within each
category. If there has been anything consistent in the federal government's approach to
identifying some Aboriginal peoples as "Indians" and not others, it has been that these
identifications have been driven by broader federal policy goals, most particularly, for much
of Canadian history, the goal of assimilation.
Historically, the class of persons the federal government recognized as being within their
jurisdiction was drawn in ever-narrower terms. In recent years though, some Aboriginal
peoples have been added to the class of people that the federal government recognizes as
"status Indians." Sometimes this is an outcome of successful equality rights challenges to the
federal definition of status,6 but it can also be a consequence of federal administrative
decisions, such as the designation of the Indigenous community of Miawpukek (previously
known as Conne River), previously deemed "non-status Indians," as "status Indians" in
1985.'Neither seems consistent with an assertion that there is an inherent distinction between
"status" and "non-status Indians," nor is there any federal legislative history to support this
idea. The Federal Court of Canada was therefore right to conclude that the constitutional
jurisdiction of the federal government is not limited to those the federal government currently
recognizes as "status Indians."
II. RE ESKIMO AS PRECEDENT FOR DANIELS
Daniels is not the first time Canadian courts have been asked to determine the extent of
the class of persons who were considered "Indians" in 1867. A pivotal prior example of the
importance of the definition ofthis term comes from the Supreme Court of Canada's decision
in Re Eskimo.' In the 1930s, the Canadian government had been supporting Inuit in northern
Quebec and billing the Quebec government.' Quebec, feeling the fiscal burden of the
Depression, argued that the Inuit were "Indians" and thus a federal responsibility; the federal
government opposed this, not wanting to be burdened with the cost of providing support, a
position rather similar to their position on whether M6tis and "non-status Indians" were
"Indians" throughout the period of the Daniels case.io The Supreme Court, however,
determined that the provision of services to the Inuit was a federal responsibility.
Chief Justice Duff, for the majority, reviewed the history of the part of Canada that was
Rupert's Land in the period before, and for a time after Confederation, to determine whether
Inuit were "Indians," in a manner very similar to Justice Phelan's analysis in Daniels. Chief
Justice Duff noted that in the 1857 census of the region undertaken by the Hudson's Bay
Company, "esquimaux" (Inuit) were included in the term "Indians" and, indeed, "Indians"
was synonymous with Aboriginal peoples (or "aborigines," in the language of the period)."
6 See e.g. McIvor v Canada (Registrar ofIndian and Northern Affairs), 2009 BCCA 153, 306 DLR (4th)
193.
Miawpukek First Nation, "About Miawpukek," online: Miawpukek First Nation <http://www.mfngov.
ca/about-miawpukek/>.
8 [1939] SCR 104 [Re Eskimo].
For a discussion of the background to Re Eskimo, see e.g. Sarah Bonesteel, Canada 's Relationship with
Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada,
2008).
0 Ibid.
Re Eskimo, supra note 8 at 106-107.
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He also noted that historical documents made it clear that Inuit in Quebec and Labrador were
also treated as "Indians." 2 Of course, Inuit were never, and still are not, subject to the Indian
Act, which simply serves to make it clear that "Indians," for the purpose of understanding the
Constitution Act, 1867, and "Indians," as subjects of the Indian Act, are not synonymous.
In his concurring judgment, Justice Cannon noted that the English word "Indians" was
construed as equivalent to the French word "sauvages," for example in the Quebec
resolutions and the Constitution Act, 1867 itself, and that the term included all Aboriginal
peoples in British North America.' 4 Justice Kerwin also wrote a concurring opinion that
reviewed a number of historical documents to come to the same conclusion.'" One lesson
from this case of relevance to Daniels is that analysis of the historical record is critical to
making rational determinations about the meaning of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867.
III. DANIELS V. CANADA
Re Eskimo gives us an analytical framework with which to analyze the decision of Justice
Phelan in the current case of Daniels. Justice Phelan noted:
In the absence of any record of debates or discussions concerning this Indian Power [in subsection 91(24)
of the Constitution Act, 1867], the Court had to rely on what was done just before and for some period after
Confederation to give context and meaning to the words of s 91(24).
The evidence concerning non-status Indians establishes that such persons were considered within the broad
class of "Indians". The situation regarding M6tis was more complex and in many instances including in the
Red River area, Mdtis leadership rejected any inclusion of Mitis as Indians. Nevertheless, M6tis generally
and over a greater area were often treated as Indians, experienced the same or similar limitations imposed
by the federal government, and suffered the same burdens and discriminations. They were at least treated as
a separate group within the broad class of "Indians."1
He then went on to review the evidence of the historical expert witnesses and documents.
As he noted,
[gliven the nature of this litigation, the Court was presented with over four centuries of history since first
contact between European settlers and the indigenous population in what became Canada.... The pre-
Confederation evidence was directed at what the term "Indian" meant at the time and thus likely was the
meaning that the Framers of Confederation had in mind when it was inserted into the s 91 powers assigned
to the federal government.17
This is consistent with how the Supreme Court of Canada used historical evidence in Re
Eskimo, as described above. Justice Phelan undertook a thorough and careful analysis of the
12 Ibid at 109-15.
3 Supra note 5, s 4.
' Supra note 8 at H17.
"Ibid at 119-24.
6 Daniels, supra note 2 at paras 24-25.
1 Ibidat para 183.
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historical evidence to assist him in understanding what the term "Indians" would have meant
to the framers of the Constitution from 1864 to 1867. He also notes that "the Supreme Court
[in Re Eskimo] accepted that those of mixed heritage were identified and treated differently
from 'whites' and were seen as 'Indian.'""8
Justice Phelan also noted, "[i]n the same vein, the federal government had largely
accepted the constitutional jurisdiction over non-status Indians and M6tis until the mid 1980s
when matters ofpolicy and financial concerns changed that acceptance."l9 He then reviewed
the history of policies for defining "Indians," both pre- and post-Confederation, the process
of enfranchisement of "deserving Indians," as he notes they were described, and how
"legislative and administrative events produced, by evolution, a group called M6tis and non-
status Indians."20 This confirms that the distinctions the federal government has made
between "status Indians" and M6tis and "non-status Indians" are not based on any inherent
differences, though there certainly are important distinctions,2' but simply on policy and
fiscal positions.
Indeed, Justice Phelan notes that, "[t]he evidence establishes the diversity of people and
degree of aboriginal connection which fell under the word 'Indian' [among the Mi'kmaq in
the 19th century]."22 He also comments, "[i]n what is now known as the Quebec-Windsor
corridor, by the mid 1860s, ... [t]he extent of the intermarriage was such that there were few
'pure blood' natives left."23 Later, Justice Phelan notes, "[i]t was [the plaintiffs historical
witness William] Wicken's opinion that prior to Confederation the term 'Indian' was
understood, at least by the Framers, to include half-breeds. In coming to that conclusion ...
Wicken relied on the pre-Confederation Indian statutes or statutes in relation to Indians."24
He reiterates this point stating, "Wicken, on the basis of this understanding, concluded that
the Framers would have intended the word 'Indian' in the constitution and the power which
went with it, to be a broad power to be able to deal with the diversity and complexity of the
native population whatever their percentage mix of blood relationship, their economies,
residency or culture."25 While Justice Phelan noted that both Alexander von Gernet and
Stephen Patterson, the Crown's historical witnesses, were of the view that "the Framers
would have had no interest in dealing with half-breeds who were not acknowledged as
members of a band or who lived as 'whites,"' 26 he also noted that Gwynneth Jones, another
historical expert witness, observed that "because so much of 'Indian' relations were policy
driven, the Framers wanted and needed a broad power to ensure maximum flexibility."27
Such an approach would certainly have been logical in the circumstances that confronted the
Framers of the Constitution in the 1860s.
8 Ibid at para 558.
19 Ibidatpara27.
20 Ibid at paras 92, 94.
21 R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43, [20031 2 SCR 207, clearly identified that the M6tis were a distinct
community.
22 Daniels, supra note 2 at para 218.
23 Ibid at para 240.
24 Ibid at para 265.
25 Ibid at para 273.
26 Ibid at para 274.
.27 Ibidat para 275.
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Justice Phelan also identified several other instances in legislation, government reports,
and pre-Confederation treaties in which "half-breeds" were defined as "Indians," even ifthey
did not live on a reserve. At one point in his judgment, for example, he notes, "[William]
Robinson counted half-breeds in the population subject to the treaties for purposes of
calculating overall annuities owed."2 3 The Robinson-Huron and Robinson-Superior treaties
provided "the model for the post-Confederation numbered treaties in Western Canada."29 He
concludes, "[tihis experience and recognized need speaks to the requirement for and
understanding that the s 91(24) power had to be sufficiently broad that the federal
government could address a wide range of situations, in a wide range of ways covering a
diverse composition of native people."30
The historical evidence makes this conclusion rather obvious. This is really the only basis
on which one can understand the meaning of the word "Indian" in the Constitution Act, 1867
as there was no discussion of the term or the extent of the "Indian power" at either the
Charlottetown or Quebec Conferences of 1864 or the London Conference of 1866." Justice
Phelan also notes that in the Northwest in the period after Confederation, "the aboriginal
population was mixed, varied, and interrelated. It was not possible to draw a bright line
between half-breeds/M6tis and Indians."32 He later, notably, comments that "the early post-
1867 evidence shows that half-breeds were considered as at least a subset of a wider group
of aboriginal-based people called 'Indians."' 3 3 He also cites several examples of post-
Confederation legislation and notes, "[t]he foregoing examples established that the federal
government exercised jurisdiction over a broad range of persons with native ancestry who
did not have status as Indians under the Indian Act."34
Justice Phelan also correctly notes that the federal government's assertion that it can
define for constitutional purposes who is an "Indian" by its own legislation would allow "the
federal government to expand and contract their constitutional jurisdictions over Indians
unilaterally."" While it would be appropriate to alter the extent of federal jurisdiction by
agreement of the relevant parties, including the Aboriginal people(s) concerned, through
something such as a self-government agreement, unilateral actions of the federal government,
either asserting or denying jurisdiction, are not appropriate. Justice Phelan notes:
It is a settled constitutional principle that no level of government can expand its constitutional jurisdiction
by actions or legislation.... The federal government may wish to limit the number of Indians for which it will
grant recognition under the Indian Act ... but that does not necessarily disqualify such other Indians from
being Indians under the Constitution.
3 6
28 Ibidatpara311.
29 Ibid at para 306.
3o Ibidatpara318.
31 Ibid at paras 332-36.
32 Ibidatpara381.
3 Ibidatpara420.
3 Ibid at para 467.
3 Ibidat para 112.
36 Ibidatpara 113.
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Justice Phelan thus comes to the following conclusion:
Both in principle and in practice, one of the essential elements of the Indian power was to vest in the federal
government the power to legislate in relation to people who are defined, at least in a significant way, by their
native heredity. As said earlier, the factor which distinguishes both non-status Indians and Mdtis from the
rest of Canadians ... is that native heritage - their "Indianess." 37
Later, he expands upon this conclusion and connects it specifically to the Supreme Court
of Canada's decision in Re Eskimo, stating:
Applying the purposive approach in light of the finding in In Re Eskimo Reference, above, I accept the
Plaintiffs' argument supported by the opinions of Professor Wicken and Ms. Jones that the purpose of the
Indian Power included the intent to control all people of aboriginal heritage in the new territories of
Canada.... Absent a broad power over a broad range of people sharing a native hereditary base, the federal
government would have difficulty achieving this goal.3 8
In the end, Justice Phelan decides that:
The case for inclusion of non-status Indians in s 91(24) is more direct and clear than in respect of Mdtis. The
situation of the Mdtis is more complex and more diverse and must be viewed from a broad perspective. On
balance, the Court also concludes that M6tis are included in s 91(24).
Therefore, the Plaintiffs will be entitled to a declaration in their favour and to that effect.
39
IV. EARLY DEFINITIONS OF "INDIAN"
Given the historical record of Indigenous-Crown relations, this really is the only logical
conclusion one could come to. Settler-state governments did not seek to define who was an
"Indian" for some time after contact; even when they did, their initial legislative definitions
were quite broad and effectively recognized Aboriginal authority to define their citizens and
members. The first legislative definition of "Indian" was contained in An Act for the better
protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians in Lower Canada in 1850.40 This
definition was a broad one, and it included all persons of "Indian blood" who were "reputed
to belong to the particular Body or Tribe" and their descendants, all persons intermarried
with this first group and residing among them, and their descendants, all persons residing
among the "Indians" whose parents on either side were "Indians," and all persons "adopted
in infancy by any such Indians" and their descendants. 4' This broad definition did not last
long, however; the legislation was amended the following year to exclude those adopted in
infancy and non-Indian men married to Indian women.42
37 Ibid at para 544.
38 Ibid at para 566.
3 Ibid at paras 600-601.
40 (UK), 13 & 14 Vict, c 42.
41 Ibid, s 5.
42 An Act to repeal in part and to amendanAct, intituled, AnAct for the better protection ofthe Lands and
property of the Indians in Lower Canada, 1851, (UK), 14 & 15 Vict, c 59, s 2.
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Post-Confederation, an "Indian" was a male person of "Indian blood" belonging to a band,
or his wife and children, and a band was defined as a grouping of "Indians" who have an
interest in a reserve or Indian lands in common, with the legal title in the Crown, or share
alike in the distribution of money with governmental responsibility.43 Running opposite to
this was a "non-treaty Indian"; they lacked a relationship with the Crown, though they had
"Indian blood" and lived the "Indian mode of life" or were members of an "irregular band,"
which itself was simply a grouping of people with "Indian blood" that had no treaty, or an
interest in land or money from the Crown." These definitions are not very precise; there is
no clear understanding of what an "Indian mode of life" is, nor of how much blood one
requires to have "Indian blood."
There are a number of good critiques of the construction of the "Indian mode of life," so
we will refrain from giving it a lengthy discussion.45 Two points, however, are worth noting.
First, it was generally accepted that there was a clear definition of what it meant to be living
an "Indian mode of life." This was not a contentious term. Second, the entire definition of
"Indian" in the early days was based on an individual's relationship with the Crown.
Distinctions were made between otherwise equivalent people based on whether they lived
on a reserve or shared in the distribution of government money.
The 1906 Indian Act brought no significant changes to the definitions found in the 1876
Act, but it began defining a number of other concepts. Foremost is that of enfranchisement,
which was practically restricted to treaty Indians, since it was based on the enfranchised
Indian receiving a portion of the reserve.47 The exception to this restriction shows the
emphasis on the reserve status: section 122 of the 1906 Indian Act allowed that an Indian
who was not a member of a band in question (including a "non-treaty Indian" in general) but
who has been allowed to live on the reserve was treated as effectively the same as any
member of that band in terms of their right of access to the enfranchisement process.48
Thus, enfranchisement was focused on land rights and was meant to be applied on a case-
by-case basis to particular reserves. Most importantly, enfranchisement acted to erase the
individual from the class of "Indian."49 This fit with the general purpose of the Indian Act,
with its focus to protect the Indians and to "uplift" them into the proper, settler lifestyle. To
ensure that it achieved this policy purpose effectively, the enfranchisement rules in the Indian
Act varied over time. Voluntary enfranchisement was provided for under various
amendments to the Indian Act, but enfranchisement was also mandatory under certain
circumstances, and these circumstances varied over time. Indeed, 1920 amendments to the
Indian Act included a provision that allowed "Indians" who were not band members (who
today would be defined as "non-status Indians" and therefore not "Indians" at all by the
federal government) to be enfranchised.o This provision does raise the question of whether
4 An Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting Indians, 1876, (UK) 43 Vict, c 28, s 3.
4 Ibid.
4 See e.g. Constance Macintosh, "From Judging Culture to Taxing 'Indians': Tracing the Legal Discourse
of the 'Indian Mode of Life"' (2009) 47:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 399.
46 Indian Act, RSC 1906, c 81.
47 Ibid, s 2(h).
48 Ibid, s 122.
4 Ibid, s 119.
so An Act to Amend the Indian Act, 10-11 George V, c 50, s 3.
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the federal government consistently took the view that those who were not band members
and did not live an "Indian mode of life" were not "Indians"; if they were not, according to
the federal government's definition of that term, there would be no need to provide them with
a means to enfranchise.
There is one final provision of the 1906 Indian Act that demonstrates the evolving nature
of reserves and of Indian status: the provision that established "special reserves." A special
reserve was:
[A]ny tract or tracts of land, and everything belonging thereto, set apart for the use or benefit of and held in
trust for any band or irregular band of Indians, the title of which is vested in a society, corporation or
community legally established, and capable of suing and being sued, or in a person or persons of European
descent.5
Functionally, this special reserve was similar to a reserve, but was not set up by treaty. We
can see in this a parallel to the division between "status Indians" (at the time known as
"treaty") and "non-status Indians" ("non-treaty").
This system, too, fits with the assimilationist policy of the time. An "irregular band" was
nomadic or semi-nomadic, which did not fit in well with the settler culture and its conception
of private property. By forming a treaty and its associated reserve, the band would be pinned
down in one location, and could be more easily convinced to accept the adoption of settler
culture. The final stage of that acceptance would be full enfranchisement.
Ironically, then, according to the conception at the time, the "non-treaty Indians" were the
most purely "Indian." By not being considered "treaty Indians," however, they were denied
a number of rights that were granted to the further-assimilated "treaty Indians." This
culminated in the overhaul of the Indian Act in 1951, which abolished the concept of the
irregular bands entirely.52 As Robert Groves puts it, the 1951 Act "ended the presumption that
a reasonable number of Indian people remained to be brought into regular relations with the
Crown."" Those "Indians" who had not partially assimilated by concluding a treaty with the
Crown were left out in the cold, redefined as not being "Indian" at all.
V. THE RATIONALE FOR HAVING AN "INDIAN" DESIGNATION
It is impossible to understand the changes in the definition of "Indian" as a set of coherent
policy choices without an understanding of the uses to which those definitions were put. The
definition of "Indian" in place periodically was not a reflection of any understanding of who
was inherently an Indigenous person; simply put, defining "Indian" was an exercise to
advance the desire of the federal government to "elevate" (otherwise known as assimilate)
Aboriginal peoples and bring them into the dominant, settler culture. By having a definition
of "Indian," and of various related concepts such as "non-status Indian," "Indian living off-
reserve," "landless band" or "irregular band," and "enfranchisement," the government could
si Indian Act, supra note 46, s 2(j).
52 Supra note 5.
53 Robert K Groves, "The Curious Case of the Irregular Band: A Case Study of Canada's Missing
Recognition Policy" (2007) 70:1 Sask L Rev 153 at 166.
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track the progression of individuals from "Indian" to full assimilation over a large
population.
Beyond the general desire to assimilate Aboriginal peoples, the federal policy was also
driven by a desire to contain the federal cost of providing services to Aboriginal peoples. By
setting out just who is an "Indian," the federal government could further set out its own
requirements for any social programs it enacted to benefit "Indians." Throughout the history
of the Indian Act, and persisting into the present day, is the fear that benefits earmarked for
"Indian" people are used by those who do not "deserve" it, because they do not act like a
stereotypical "Indian." For example, during the debates on amendments to the Indian Act in
1920, W.A. Boys, MP from North Simcoe said: "Personally I see no reason why Indians who
leave the reserve and work in the shops of Montreal, Brantford or other cities should have
the protection to which an Indian is entitled to under the Act ... many of them are
professional men, doctors and lawyers, and should not be treated as wards.... They are in just
the same position as white men."54
Boys' concern was for an "Indian" man to be liable for debts. Today, the equivalent
debates are those over educational funding for "Indians" and the lack of taxation of "status
Indians." Thus, both the assimilationist policy driver and the fiscal driver have continued to
push the federal government in the same direction: Aboriginal peoples are wards of the state
and beneficiaries of Crown largesse, rather than parties to historical agreements with the
Crown designed to establish a positive relationship with Aboriginal peoples, that would
facilitate the settlement of North America by European powers. Justice Phelan's decision in
Daniels is one step in the direction of bringing an end to the idea that Aboriginal peoples are
simply the beneficiaries of Crown largesse, and that it is, therefore, legitimate for the Crown
to decide, unilaterally, who it wishes to benefit with its largesse from among Aboriginal
peoples generally.
VI. CONCLUSION:
ASSESSING THE DANIELS V. CANADA DECISION
Justice Phelan's decision in Daniels is thus a valuable contribution to our understanding
of Aboriginal law, Canadian constitutional history, and the division of powers in the
Constitution Act, 1867. The most obvious feature of this case, of course, is that it is very long
- 619 paragraphs to be precise. Justice Phelan, however, had a reason to write such a long
decision; with its length is a seriousness and thoroughness ofanalysis. His decision addresses
the testimony of each expert witness and assesses the wealth of sometimes-competing
interpretations of the historical record to attempt to understand who the Framers of the
Constitution would have understood to have been included in the term "Indians" when they
proposed to provide the federal government with a constitutional jurisdiction over "Indians
and lands reserved for the Indians." His analytical approach is also consistent with that ofthe
Supreme Court of Canada in its decision in Re Eskimo.
Beyond this, it is also simply necessary to address the issue. Under the division ofpowers,
either the federal or provincial governments is vested with jurisdiction over every
$4 House of Commons Debates, 13th Parl, 4th Sess, Vol 5 (23 June 1920) at 4030-31 (WA Boys).
892 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2013) 50:4
governmental activity. The fact that section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives the federal
government jurisdiction over "Indians" makes the question ofjust who is included within the
scope of this federal jurisdiction inevitable. It is true that a self-government agreement that
vests jurisdiction over an Aboriginal people in an Aboriginal government, separate from
either the federal or provincial governments, would make the question of whether the federal
or provincial governments have jurisdiction over that Aboriginal people effectively
irrelevant. Until such self-government authority is negotiated or otherwise recognized by the
federal and provincial governments, the question about the meaning of the term "Indians"
in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is necessarily with us.
Given the thoroughness of Justice Phelan's analysis of the historical record and the logic
of the conclusions he draws from it for both M6tis and "non-status Indians," it seems difficult
to challenge his result as ill-considered. Nonetheless, the federal government has appealed
the decision and, no doubt, this case will not be resolved until decided upon by the Supreme
Court of Canada. Still, it is difficult to imagine a logically and legally sound set of reasons
for the higher courts to overturn Justice Phelan's decision. The inevitable result has, indeed,
come to pass after many years of litigation.
